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STATE STANDING IN UNITED STATES V
TEXAS: OPENING THE FLOODGATES TO




In United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court, by an equally divided
vote offour to four, affirmed the decision of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court
ofAppeals that the State of Texas had Article III standing to challenge the
Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") directive establishing a
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Resi-
dents ("DAPA') program to grant lawful immigration status to millions
of undocumented immigrants. A serious question is whether state stand-
ing in this case will open the floodgates to allow states to challenge virtu-
ally every federal executive action. On the other hand, state challenges
are arguably appropriate in a federalist system to oppose expansive na-
tional government overreaching that depreciates the rights of states and
their citizens.
In its 2007 decision Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court endorsed the
principle that states deserve special solicitude for standing because of
their quasi-sovereign or parens patriae interest in protecting their citi-
zens, and because they abandoned their sovereign rights to join a federal
nation-state. The petitioner federal government tried to distinguish the
Texas litigation from the prior Massachusetts decision. In particular, the
federal government argued that Texas grieved of a self-inflicted injury
because it could have raised its fees on driver's licenses to avoid incur-
ring costs from issuing licenses to immigrants covered by DAPA. A ma-
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513-556-0094, Fax 513-556-1236, e-mail: brad.mank@uc.edu. I thank my faculty for their comments at a
summer presentation and especially Michael Solimine for his comments. All errors or omissions are my re-
sponsibility. I joined an amicus brief favoring the standing of the State of Texas in Brief for Federal Courts
Scholars and Southeastern Legal Foundation as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, United States v. Texas,
136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/15-674-bsac-
Fed-Courts-Scholars.pdf. I argued in favor of state standing in my articles, Bradford C. Mank, No Article III
Standing for Private Plaintifs Challenging State Greenhouse Gas Regulations: The Ninth Circuit's Decision
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States, 49 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1701 (2008).
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jority of the Fifth Circuit panel, however, relied upon the Massachusetts
decision's "special solicitude "for state standing in concluding that Tex-
as had an injury sufficient by standing from having to issue driver's li-
censes, although one judge dissented. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit in
Texas suggested several legal doctrines that would limit the number of
state suits and, thus, avoid allowing a flood of state suits against the U.S.
government.
This Article considers several theories relating to state standing and
then proposes a state-standing approach based upon both the Massachu-
setts and Texas decisions. In light of these two decisions, there is a feder-
alism argument for allowing expansive state standing to address injuries
to a state's quasi-sovereign and parens patriae interests. Additionally,
there is a conservative or libertarian argument for broad state standing
to limit excessive national or executive authority. This Article, however,
agrees with the Fifth Circuit's approach in Texas-allowing state stand-
ing in suits where there is a substantial injury to a state's interest but us-
ing other legal doctrines to prevent a deluge of state suits on every con-
ceivable issue.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Texas, the Supreme Court, by an equally divided vote
of four to four, affirmed the decision of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
that the State of Texas had Article III standing to challenge in federal court the
Department of Homeland Security's ("DHS") directive establishing a Deferred
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents ("DAPA")
program to grant lawful immigration status to millions of undocumented im-
migrants.' A serious question is whether state standing in this case will open
the floodgates to allow states to challenge virtually every federal executive ac-
tion.2 On the other hand, state challenges are arguably appropriate in a federal-
ist system to oppose overreach by an expansive national government that de-
preciates the rights of states and their citizens. 3
In its 2007 decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court endorsed the
principle that states deserve special solicitude for standing because of their
quasi-sovereign or parens patriae interest in protecting their citizens, and be-
cause they abandoned their sovereign rights to join a federal nation-state.4 The
petitioner federal government tried to distinguish the Texas litigation from the
prior Massachusetts decision.5 In particular, the federal government argued
that Texas grieved of a self-inflicted injury because it could have raised its fees
on driver's licenses to avoid incurring costs from issuing licenses to immi-
grants covered by DAPA.6 A majority of the Fifth Circuit panel, however, re-
lied upon the Massachusetts decision's "special solicitude" for state standing
in concluding that Texas had an injury sufficient for standing by having to is-
sue driver's licenses, although one judge dissented.7 Nevertheless, the Fifth
Circuit in Texas suggested several legal doctrines that would limit the number
of state suits, and, thus, avoid allowing a flood of state suits against the U.S.
government.8
This Article considers several theories relating to state standing and then
proposes a state-standing approach based upon both the Massachusetts and
1. 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016), aff'g by an equally divided court, Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th
Cir. 2015).
. 2. Brief for Professor Walter Dellinger As Amicus Curiae In Support of Petitioners at 10-15, United
States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No.15-674), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/
2016/03/15-674-tsac-Dellinger.pdf (arguing Texas's standing argument would open the floodgates to endless
state challenges to federal actions); Amanda Frost, Symposium: Second Thoughts on Standing, SCOTUSBLOG
(June 24, 2016, 7:28 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-second-thoughts-on-standing/
(arguing the same); Todd Ruger, Immigration Case Boils Down to State v. Feds, CQ MAGAZINE, Apr. 2016, at
27-29 (arguing the same); see also infra Section I.C.
3. Ernest Young, Symposium: United States v. Texas and the Future of State-Federal Litigation, SCO-
TUSblog (June 24, 2016, 9:27 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-united-states-v-texas-
and-the-future-of-state-federal-litigation/ (arguing in favor of state standing).
4. 549 U.S. 497, 518-20 (2007); Bradford C. Mank, Should States Have Greater Standing Rights Than
Ordinary Citizens?: Massachusetts v. EPA's New Standing Test for States, 49 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV.
1701, 1727-29 (2008) [hereinafter Mank, States Standing] (discussing state standing under quasi-sovereign or
parens patriae theories of standing); see infra Part M.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See id.
7. See infra Section IV.B.
8. See infra Section IV.B.
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Texas decisions.9 In light of these two decisions, there is a federalism argument
for allowing expansive state standing to address injuries to a state's quasi-
sovereign and parens patriae interests.' 0 Additionally, there is a conservative
or libertarian argument for broad state standing to limit excessive national or
executive authority."I This Article, however, agrees with the Fifth Circuit's ap-
proach in Texas-allowing state standing in suits where there is a substantial
injury to a state's interest but using other legal doctrines to prevent a deluge of
state suits on every conceivable issue.12
Part II explains the basics of Article III standing.1 3 Part III examines the
state-standing decision in Massachusetts and Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting
opinion in that case.14 Part IV discusses the Texas litigation and focuses on the
Fifth Circuit's standing analysis.1 5 Part V considers various theories of state
standing. and argues in favor of state standing as a furtherance of federalism
principles and state's rights against the federal government.1 6 Part VI, the con-
clusion, favors state standing in appropriate cases where the federal govern-
ment causes a significant injury to a state's interests but also recognizes the
need to invoke various limitations on suits to prevent suits over minor issues
that do not substantially harm a state's interests.17
II. ARTICLE III CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING' 8
While the Constitution does not explicitly require that every plaintiff es-
tablish "standing" to file suit in a federal court, the Supreme Court has implied
from Article III's limitation of judicial decisions to "cases" and "controver-
sies" that federal courts must mandate standing requirements to ensure that a
plaintiff has a genuine interest and a stake in the outcome of a case.1 9 For a
9. See infra Part V.
10. See infra Part II; infra Section IV.B; infra Section V.A.
11. See infra Section V.B; see generally RANDY BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION 168-202
(2016) (arguing for federalism, states' rights, and local control as the most practical antidote to concentrated
power in our national government).
12. See infra Section IV.B.
13. See infra Part II.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. See infra Part V.
17. See infra Part VI.
18. Part II is based on my previous standing scholarship. See Bradford C. Mank, No Article III Standing
for Private Plaintiffs Challenging State Greenhouse Gas Regulations: The Ninth Circuit's Decision in Wash-
ington Environmental Council v. Bellon, 63 AM. U. L. REv. 1525 (2014) [hereinafter Mank, Standing for Pri-
vate Plaintiffs]; Mank, States Standing, supra note 4.
19. The constitutional standing requirements are derived from Article III, Section 2, which provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws
of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases af-
fecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Juris-
diction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Controversies between two or
more States;--between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States;-
between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl.1; see Stark v. Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) (stating that Article M grants
courts the power to "adjudicate cases and controversies as to claims of infringement of individual rights
whether by unlawful action or private persons or by the exertion of unauthorized administrative power"); see
also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 340-41 (2006) (explaining why the Supreme Court infers
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federal court to have jurisdiction over a case, at least one plaintiff must show
he has standing to seek each form of relief sought.20 Federal courts must dis-
miss a case if none of the plaintiffs meet the established Article III standing
requirements. 21
Standing requirements are based upon core constitutional principles. The
standing doctrine incorporates the principle that federal courts should not hear
or issue advisory opinions because such cases are not genuine cases or contro-
versies. 22 Also, standing requirements are consistent with separation of powers
principles defining the division of powers between the judiciary and political
branches of government so that the "Federal Judiciary respects 'the proper-
and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."' 2 3
Different members of the Supreme Court have disagreed, however, con-
cerning when separation of powers principles limit Congress's authority to au-
thorize standing for private citizens to sue in federal courts challenging the ex-
ecutive branch's under- or non-enforcement of congressional requirements that
are arguably mandated by statute.24 Justice Scalia, who died in February 2016
shortly before United States v. Texas was argued,25 adopted a narrow approach
to Article III standing because of his belief that courts and lawsuits should in-
terfere with the policies of the executive branch only if a plaintiff had a per-
sonal, concrete injury. 26 Yet, some commentators believe that Texas would
that Article III's case and controversy requirement necessitates standing limitations and clarifying that "[i]f a
dispute is not a proper case or controversy, the courts have no business deciding it"). See generally Michael E.
Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers and Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023, 1036-38 (2009)
(discussing a scholarly debate on whether the Framers intended the Constitution to require standing to sue).
20. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 355 ("[A] plaintiff must demonstrate standing separately for each
form of relief sought.") (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
185 (2000)); Mank, States Standing, supra note 4, at 1710.
21. See DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 340-41 (emphasizing the importance of the case or controversy
requirement); Friends ofthe Earth, 528 U.S. at 180 (adding that courts have an affirmative duty at the outset
of the litigation to ensure that litigants satisfy all Article III standing requirements).
22. See Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 171-72 (2013) ("Article III of the Constitution restricts the
power of federal courts to 'Cases' and 'Controversies.' Accordingly, . . . [t]o invoke the jurisdiction of a feder-
al court, a litigant must have suffered, or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and
likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. Federal courts may not decide questions that cannot
affect the rights of litigants in the case before them or give opinion[s] advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.") (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
23. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 341 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted), partially abrogated by Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.
Ct. 1377 (2014)).
24. Compare Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
("Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate chains of causation that will give rise to a case or
controversy where none existed before."), and id. at 602 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that the "principal
effect" of the majority's approach to standing was "to transfer power into the hands of the Executive at the
expense-not of the Courts-but of Congress, from which that power originates and emanates"), with id. at
573-78 (concluding that Articles II and III of the Constitution limit Congress's authority to authorize citizen
suits by any person lacking a concrete injury and citing several recent Supreme Court decisions for support).
See generally Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REv. 459, 496 (2008) (suggesting that
"[u]surprisingly, sharp disagreement exists over what separation of powers requires" and arguing that courts
should not use standing doctrine as "a backdoor way to limit Congress's legislative power").
25. Judy Melinek, Justice Scalia's Unexamined Death Points to a Problem, CNN (Feb. 20, 2016, 9:38
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/18/opinions/justice-scalia-no-autopsy-melinek/.
26. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573-78 (concluding that Articles II and III of the Constitution limit Congress's
authority to authorize citizen suits by any person lacking a concrete personal injury); Antonin Scalia, The Doc-
trine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881, 885, 891,
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have won the case five votes to four if Justice Scalia had lived to hear the case
because of his concerns that the Obama Administration had overreached its ex-
ecutive authority in promulgating DAPA.27
The Supreme Court has established a three-part test for constitutional Ar-
ticle III standing that requires a plaintiff to show that: (1) she has "suffered an
injury-in-fact," which is (a) "concrete and particularized" and (b) "actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical"; (2) "there [is] a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fair-
ly . .. trace[able] 28 to the challenged action of the defendant, and not ... th[e]
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court"; and
(3) "it [is] likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be re-
dressed by a favorable decision." 29 The plaintiff bears the burden of proving all
three elements of constitutional Article III standing. 30
III. MASSACHUSETTS V. EPA: PARENSPATRIAE STATE STANDING 3 1
The rights of state governments to obtain standing may be different from
non-state or private parties in some circumstances. In Massachusetts, the Su-
preme Court held that a state government, the Commonwealth of Massachu-
setts, had Article III standing to sue the federal government for its failure to
regulate greenhouse gas ("GHG") emissions under the federal Clean Air Act
("CAA") because states are "entitled to special solicitude in [the] standing
analysis." 32 The Massachusetts decision did not squarely consider whether pri-
vate parties have similar standing rights to bring climate-change suits against
894-97 (1983) (arguing separation of powers principles require litigants in federal courts to have personal,
concrete injury to have standing).
27. Jonathan Adler, Symposium: Tripped up by a Tie Vote, SCOTUSBLOG (June 24, 2016, 7:41 AM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/symposium-tripped-up-by-a-tie-vote/ ("The fact that the Court split four-
four means, in all likelihood, the Obama administration would have lost the case had Justice Antonin Scalia
not passed away earlier this year.").
28. The Lexmark decision explained the distinction between the standing requirement of fairly traceable
causation and the ultimate question of proving proximate causation on the merits as follows:
Proximate causation is not a requirement of Article III standing, which requires only that the plaintiffs
injury be fairly traceable to the defendant's conduct. Like the zone-of-interests test ... it is an element of
the cause of action under the statute, and so is subject to the rule that "the absence of a valid (as opposed
to arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction.". . . But like any other ele-
ment of a cause of action, it must be adequately alleged at the pleading stage in order for the case to pro-
ceed .... If a plaintiff's allegations, taken as true, are insufficient to establish proximate causation, then
the complaint must be dismissed; if they are sufficient, then the plaintiff is entitled to an opportunity to
prove them.
Lexmark Int'l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1391 n.6 (2014).
29. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (citations omitted) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
30. DaimlerChrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 ("[P]arties ... asserting federal jurisdiction [must] carry the bur-
den of establishing their standing under Article III."); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 ("The party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements."); Bradford C. Mank, Prudential Standing Doc-
trine Abolished or Waiting for a Comeback?: Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 213, 257-58 (2015).
31. The discussion of Massachusetts v. EPA and state standing in Part m is based on my two earlier
articles, Mank, States Standing, supra note 4, at 1727-29 and especially Mank, Standing for Private Plaintiffs,
supra note 18, at 1536-45.
32. 549 U.S. 497, 518-20 (2007); Mank, Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 18, at 1528, 1536-
38.
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the federal government or large, private GHG emitters, but the Court suggested
that private parties might have lesser standing rights in observing that "[i]t is of
considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign State
and not, as it was in Lujan [v. Defenders of Wildlife], a private individual." 33 In
the Massachusetts decision, the Court for the first time established that states
have greater standing rights in some circumstances than non-state litigants pur-
suant to the parens patriae doctrine.34 Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opin-
ion, however, argued that states do not have greater standing rights than non-
state litigants.35
A. Justice Stevens's Majority Opinion on State Standing
The Massachusetts decision invoked the parens patriae doctrine as a
primary reason for recognizing greater standing rights for states than non-state
plaintiffs. 36 The parens patriae doctrine originated as an English common law
doctrine concerning the authority of the English King to protect incompetent
persons, including minors, the mentally ill, and mentally limited persons.37 Be-
ginning in the early twentieth century, the Supreme Court recognized that
states may sue in their capacity as parens patriae to protect quasi-sovereign
interests in the health, welfare, and natural resources of state citizens. 38
Invoking the parens patriae doctrine, the Massachusetts decision stated
that "the special position and interest of Massachusetts" was crucial in decid-
ing the standing questions. 39 The Court observed that "[i]t is of considerable
relevance that the party seeking review here is a sovereign State and not, as it
was in Lujan, a private individual." 40 Citing as precedent Justice Holmes's
1907 Georgia v. Tennessee Copper opinion, which allowed Georgia to sue on
behalf of its citizens to protect them from air pollution from another state be-
cause of the state's quasi-sovereign interest in its natural resources and its citi-
zens' health, the Massachusetts decision concluded that the Court had long ago
"recognized that States are not normal litigants for the purposes of invoking
federal jurisdiction." 4 1 The Massachusetts decision reasoned that, "[]ust as
Georgia's independent interest 'in all the earth and air within its domain' sup-
ported federal jurisdiction a century ago, so too does Massachusetts' well-
founded desire to preserve its sovereign territory today." 42 Furthermore, the
Massachusetts court relied on the fact that Massachusetts "own[ed] a great deal
of the 'territory alleged to be affected' to "reinforce[] the conclusion that its
33. 549 U.S. 497, 518-20; Mank, Standingfor Private Plaintiffs, supra note 18, at 1528, 1536-39.
34. 549 U.S. at 518-20 (2007); Mank, Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 18, at 1542-45.
35. 549 U.S. at 535, 548-49.
36. Id. at 518-20.
37. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. P.R. ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982); Lawrence. B. Custer,
The Origins of the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195, 195 (1978); Mank, States Standing, supra
note 4, at 1756-57.
38. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-19; Georgia v. Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Mank,
States Standing, supra note 4, at 1757-59.
39. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 518 (citing Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237).
42. Id. (quoting Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237).
No. 2]1 217
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
stake in the outcome of this case is sufficiently concrete to warrant the exercise
of federal judicial power." 43
Moreover, the Massachusetts decision concluded that states had standing
to protect their quasi-sovereign interest in the health and welfare of their citi-
zens because they had surrendered three essential sovereign authorities to the
federal government: First, states may no longer use military force against other
states or foreign governments; second, the Constitution forbids states from ne-
gotiating treaties with foreign governments; and third, federal laws may
preempt state laws in some cases. 44 Because states had surrendered three im-
portant sovereign powers to the federal government, the Court reasoned that
states could use their parens patriae authority as a partial substitute to retain a
unique role for the states in a federal system of government by allowing states
to sue in federal court to protect their quasi-sovereign interests in the health,
welfare, and natural resources of their citizens.45
Justice Stevens's majority opinion in Massachusetts confusingly com-
bined the parens patriae or quasi-sovereign rationale for state standing with
other theories for recognizing standing, such as the argument that Congress
conferred in the CAA a procedural right for states to challenge certain EPA de-
cisions.46 To validate state standing for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,
the Court invoked statutory language in the CAA to determine that Congress
had required the EPA to use the federal government's sovereign powers to pro-
tect states, among others, from vehicle emissions "which in [the Administra-
tor's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 47 Also, the Massachusetts
decision observed that Congress has "recognized a concomitant procedural
right to challenge the rejection of its rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capri-
cious." 48 Mixing these statutory justifications for standing with the parens pa-
triae or quasi-sovereign rationale for state standing, the Court reasoned,
"[g]iven that procedural right and Massachusetts' stake in protecting its quasi-
sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our
standing analysis." 49
A serious difficulty with the reasoning for state standing in the Massa-
chusetts decision is that the Court did not clarify to what extent its acknowl-
edgement of greater standing rights for states derived from parens patriae or
quasi-sovereign principles or was based upon statutory or procedural rights in
the CAA.50 Because the Massachusetts decision relied on several different jus-
tifications for state standing, it is more complicated to decide how state-
standing issues should be decided in cases with different facts, such as the im-
43. Id. at 519 (quoting Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 519-20.
46. Id.
47. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2012)).
48. Id. at 520 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1) (2012)).
49. Id.
50. Mank, States Standing, supra note 4, at 1733-34, 1746-47, 1755-56 (criticizing Massachusetts for
not clarifying to what extent state standing in the case resulted from the parens patriae doctrine as opposed to
other factors); Mank, Standing for Private Plaintifs, supra note 18, at 1538-39 (criticizing the same).
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migration challenges in the Texas litigation.5 Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit in
the Texas litigation properly relied upon the Massachusetts decision's recogni-
tion of special standing rights for states. 52
B. ChiefJustice Roberts's Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized that climate
change is a global political problem that should be decided by the political
branches, and therefore, it is a nonjusticiable general grievance unsuitable for
resolution by the federal courts. 53 He also contended that neither the CAA nor
the Constitution provided for the Court to apply a more generous standing test
for states. 54 Moreover, he argued that states did not have greater standing rights
under relevant parens patriae precedent.55
1. Parens Patriae Precedent Does Not Give States Expanded Standing Rights
Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the Court in the Tennessee Cop-
per decision granted states greater rights than private litigants, but he contend-
ed that the case provided states with more rights "solely with respect to availa-
ble remedies" in authorizing Georgia to receive equitable relief when private
litigants could obtain only a legal remedy.56 He maintained that "[t]he case had
nothing to do with Article III standing."57 His standing argument is correct in a
narrow sense, because the Court did not develop the modem standing doctrine
until the 1940s, 58 but he did not address the suggestion in the majority opinion
that broad standing rights for states would allow them to protect their quasi-
sovereign interest in protecting the health of their citizens or their natural re-
sources. 59
Adopting a restrictive interpretation of parens patriae precedent, Chief
Justice Roberts reasoned that parens patriae litigation does not eliminate a
plaintiff-state's mandate to establish an Article III standing injury because "[a]
claim of parens patriae standing is distinct from an allegation of direct injury,"
and "[f]ar from being a substitute for Article III injury, parens patriae actions
raise an additional hurdle for a state litigant: the articulation of a 'quasi-
sovereign interest' 'apart from the interests of particular private parties."' 60
Additionally, he claimed that the Court did not explain how its "special solici-
tude" for state standing could be justified "except as an implicit concession
that petitioners cannot establish standing on traditional terms." 61 There is some
51. See infra Part IV.
52. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 520; see infra Section IV.B.
53. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 535-36 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 536-40.
55. Id. at 538-39.
56. Id. at 537-38.
57. Id. at 537.
58. See supra Section I.A.
59. See supra Section M.A.
60. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 538 (Roberts, C., dissenting) (citations omitted).
61. Id. at 540.
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value to his criticism because Justice Stevens's majority opinion failed to ar-
ticulate to what degree the Court invoked "special solicitude" for Massachu-
setts's status as a state to provide an easier standing test.62 Chief Justice Rob-
erts maintained that "the status of Massachusetts as a State cannot compensate
for petitioners' failure to demonstrate injury in fact, causation, and redressabil-
ity."63
2. Climate Change is a Nonjusticiable General Grievance for the Political
Branches
Even conceding the plaintiffs' assumption that climate change is a signif-
icant public policy problem, Chief Justice Roberts, in his dissenting opinion,
contended that it was a nonjusticiable general grievance or political question
that should be decided by the political branches and not by the federal judici-
ary. 64 First, he asserted that the petitioners' injuries from global warming did
not meet Lujan's mandate that standing injuries be "particularized" because
they were common to "the public at large." 65 Next, he reasoned that the
Court's lenient approach to standing ignored separation-of-powers principles
limiting the judiciary to "concrete cases." 6 6 Then, he contended that recogniz-
ing standing in a case involving the entire nation and the world at large em-
broiled the Court in policy issues, which are only within the scope of the polit-
ical branches of government.67 He implied that the ability of state citizens to
elect representatives to Congress and a President was an adequate remedy to
the loss of state sovereign rights when states entered the United States and, ac-
cordingly, that there was no reason for the Court to establish broad standing
rights for states to raise questions of parens patriae or quasi-sovereign interests
in the federal courts. 68
In sum, Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion claimed that general-
ized harms, such as climate change, are issues to be decided by the political
branches and not by federal courts, and, therefore, he rejected the majority's
special solicitude for state standing in parens patriae or quasi-sovereign litiga-
tion.69 Yet, during the oral argument before the Supreme Court in the Texas
litigation, Chief Justice Roberts appeared to agree with Texas's argument that
it had sufficient economic injuries from issuing drivers licenses to undocu-
mented immigrants eligible for DAPA to establish Article III standing. 70 On
62. See Mank, States Standing, supra note 4, at 1733-34, 1746-47, 1755-56 (criticizing Massachusetts
for not clarifying whether and to what extent the special treatment of state standing in the case resulted from
the parens patriae doctrine as opposed to the special standing rights of plaintiffs seeking to vindicate proce-
dural rights or other factors).
63. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 540 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 535-36, 548-49.
65. Id. at 539-41, 543 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 573-74 (1992) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted).
66. Id. at 539-40, 547.
67. Id. at 535-36, 548-49.
68. See id. (arguing that the majority usurped the authority of political branches by unduly expanding
standing rights of states).
69. Mank, Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 18, at 1545.
70. Immigration, supra note 2, at 29 (reporting the standing questions during the Texas oral argument as
suggesting that Chief Justice Roberts favored the view that Texas had economic injuries from issuing driver's
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the other hand, Justice Breyer, who had joined the majority opinion in Massa-
chusetts,71 appeared to agree with the Obama Administration that recognizing
state standing based on the facts in the Texas litigation would interject the
Court into inappropriate political disputes.72 Because of the equally divided tie
vote, the Supreme Court in United States v. Texas did not reveal how the indi-
vidual justices voted in the case, so we cannot be absolutely sure whether
Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Breyer took an opposite position on state
standing in the Texas case from how they each voted on standing in the Mas-
sachusetts decision.73
IV. TEXAS V. UNITED STATES IN THE LOWER COURTS
A. Summary of the Texas Litigation in the Lower Courts
In 2012, the Secretary of DHS issued a memorandum establishing the
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals ("DACA") program, which authorized
at least 1.2 million teenagers and young adults, who were born outside the
United States but arrived in this country before the age of sixteen, to apply for
deferred action status and employment authorizations if they meet certain con-
ditions, such as not having a significant criminal record. 74 In 2014, DHS issued
a second memorandum that expanded who qualifies for DACA and increased
the length of employment authorizations from two years to three years. 75 Fur-
thermore, the 2014 memorandum established a DAPA program for up to 4.3
million undocumented immigrants who have a son or daughter who is a U.S.
citizen or lawful permanent resident to apply for deferred action status and
employment authorizations, although DAPA applicants also must meet certain
conditions, including continuously residing in the United States since before
January 1, 2010 and not being an enforcement priority for criminal convic-
tions.76
Twenty-six states filed suit against the Secretary of DHS and other feder-
al immigration officials to challenge DAPA under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act7 7 ("APA") and the Take Care Clause7 8 of the U.S. Constitution.79 In
licenses that supported standing). See generally Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-6, 9, 13, 40, United States v.
Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No.15-674), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument
transcripts/2015/15-674_b97d.pdf [hereinafter Oral Argument] (Chief Justice Roberts suggesting Texas
would have an economic injury from issuing driver's licenses to undocumented immigrants eligible for
DAPA).
71. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 501 (listing Justice Breyer in the majority).
72. Immigration, supra note 2, at 29 (characterizing the standing questions during the Texas oral argu-
ment as suggesting Justice Breyer believed that broad state standing would invite undesirable political disputes
before the Court). See generally Oral Argument, supra note 70, at 63 (Justice Breyer suggesting state standing
in Texas case would open door to too many political disputes before the Court).
73. 136 S. Ct. at 2272 ("The judgment is affirmed by an equally divided Court.").
74. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146-47 (5th Cir. 2015); Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp.
3d 591, 608-09 (S.D. Tex. 2015). By the end of 2014, DHS had approved about 636 applications. Texas, 809
F.3d at 147; Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 609.
75. Texas, 809 F.3d at 147; Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 610-11.
76. Texas, 809 F.3d at 147-48; Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 611.
77. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-559 (2012).
78. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
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2015, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in an opinion by
Judge Hanen, issued an injunction against the DAPA program on the grounds
that the plaintiff-states were likely to succeed in their APA challenge.80 The
United States appealed the injunction to the Fifth Circuit, but the court of ap-
peals, in a two-to-one decision, affirmed "the preliminary injunction because
the states have standing; they have established a substantial likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits of their procedural and substantive APA claims; and they
have satisfied the other elements required for an injunction." 81 Judge King dis-
sented from the majority opinion on all grounds, including standing and the
procedural and substantive APA claims, and she therefore argued that the in-
junction was inappropriate. 82
B. The Fifth Circuit Concludes Texas Has Injury Sufficient for Standing
from Issuing Driver Licenses to DAPA Beneficiaries
The Fifth Circuit emphasized the similarities between the Texas litigation
and the standing discussion in Massachusetts.83 The court of appeals reasoned
that the state-plaintiffs in its case were entitled to the Massachusetts decision's
"special solicitude" for standing because the APA authorized states to chal-
lenge administrative actions like DAPA, the plaintiffs were within the "zone of
interests" of the relevant immigration statutes, and DAPA affected the states'
quasi-sovereign interests in issuing drivers licenses. 84 Furthermore, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff-states' interests were comparable to those
in Massachusetts because the federal government had taken from them the
ability to control immigration, negotiate treaties with foreign nations on that
subject, or exercise their police powers regarding immigration issues.85
Additionally, the court of appeals cited the Supreme Court's opinion in
Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission,86
where the Court held that Arizona's legislature had standing to sue in response
to a ballot initiative that removed its redistricting authority and vested it in-
stead in an independent commission. 87 The Court concluded that the Arizona
legislature was "an institutional plaintiff asserting an institutional injury" in
regard to its constitutional power to regulate elections. 88 The Fifth Circuit con-
79. Texas, 809 F.3d at 146; Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 607-08. In the Supreme Court, sixteen states and
the District of Columbia filed a brief supporting the position of the U.S. Brief for the States of Washington, et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, United States v. State of Texas, et al., 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016)
(No. 15-674), http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/March-8-AG-Amicus.pdf.
80. Texas, 809 F.3d at 146; Texas, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 677.
81. Texas, 809 F.3d at 146.
82. Id. at 188-219 (King, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 151-55, 159-62 (majority opinion).
84. Id. at 151-53.
85. Id. at 153-54.
86. Id. at 154 (citing Arizona State Legislature v. Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission, 135 S.
Ct. 2652 (2015)).
87. Arizona State Legislature, 138 S. Ct. at 2665-66.
88. Id. at 2664.
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cluded that the states in Texas were similar to Arizona's legislature in "assert-
ing [an] institutional injury to their lawmaking authority." 89
The United States argued that there were three presumptions against the
state having standing to challenge DAPA.90 First, the federal government ar-
gued that there is a presumption that a plaintiff lacks standing to challenge de-
cisions to confer benefits on, or not to prosecute, a third party.91 The Fifth Cir-
cuit, however, concluded that the cases cited by the government were
inapplicable because DAPA involved more than just a decision not to prose-
cute-it also conferred benefits such as obtaining a lawful presence in the
United States and certain benefits arising from that status, including obtaining
a Texas subsidized driver's license. 92 The United States argued a second pre-
sumption against justiciability in the immigration context, but the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the cases the government cited did not involve standing. 93
Third, the United States invoked a presumption against federal courts deciding
constitutional claims against the other two branches of government, but the
court of appeals determined that it could decide the case on nonconstitutional
grounds. 94
The Fifth Circuit held that Texas had proven a standing injury from the
significant costs of issuing subsidized driver's licenses to DAPA beneficiar-
ies.95 The court of appeals rejected the United States' claim that Texas's losses
in issuing subsidized driver's licenses to DAPA beneficiaries would be offset
by other benefits to the state, such as increased employment and reduced wel-
fare costs. 96 The Fifth Circuit reasoned, "[e]ven if the government is correct,
that does not negate Texas's injury, because we consider only those offsetting
benefits that are of the same type and arise from the same transaction as the
costs." 97 The court of appeals determined that "none of the benefits the gov-
ernment identifies is sufficiently connected to the costs to qualify as an off-
set." 98
Next, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Texas had satisfied the traceable
causation portion of the standing test because DAPA would clearly result in
many beneficiaries applying for Texas driver's licenses. 99 The United States
argued that Texas's injury was self-inflicted and was therefore not a cognizable
standing injury or did not have causation proper for standing because the state
could avoid injury by not issuing licenses to illegal aliens or by not subsidizing
its licenses.100 The Fifth Circuit, however, concluded that Texas had a standing
injury and standing causation from the significant costs of issuing subsidized
89. Texas, 809 F.3d at 154.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 148-49, 154.
93. Id at 154.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 155-60.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 155.
98. Id. at 156.
99. Id. at 156-60.
100. Id. at 156-57.
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driver's licenses to DAPA beneficiaries.o10 States do not have a duty to amend
their laws whenever they may conflict with or may be preempted by federal
law. 102 Additionally, states do not have an obligation to raise fees or taxes
whenever a conflict with federal policy might create economic losses to the
states.103
The United States also argued that Texas's injury was self-inflicted be-
cause the state voluntarily chose to base its driver's license policies on federal
immigration law. 104 The government cited Pennsylvania v. New Jersey,os in
which the Court held that several states lacked standing to contest other states'
laws taxing a portion of nonresidents' incomes because the states' injuries
were self-inflicted-specifically, Pennsylvania voluntarily granted its residents
a tax credit for taxes paid to New Jersey and grieved of its tax losses.1 06 By
contrast to the voluntary tax losses Pennsylvania inflicted upon itself, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that Texas could not avoid losses from granting driver's li-
censes because Texas has a duty to follow federal immigration classifications
in determining who is eligible for driver's licenses, and, therefore, Texas must
issue driver's licenses to DAPA beneficiaries if the memorandum creating the
program is lawful.1 0 7 Moreover, Texas had not manufactured standing because
the Texas legislature had adopted subsidized licenses a year before the gov-
ernment announced the DACA program and three years before DHS promul-
gated DAPA. 108
The Fifth Circuit rejected the United States' contention that Texas had
failed to prove traceable causation between the DAPA program and the likeli-
hood of losses from the issuance of licenses to DAPA beneficiaries.10 9 The
court of appeals concluded that it was probable that many DAPA beneficiaries
living in Texas would apply for driver's licenses and that there was less doubt
about causation in this case than in the Massachusetts decision.11 0 The Fifth
Circuit concluded that DAPA would be the primary cause for increased costs
for the driver's license program in Texas and that the state had therefore prov-
en traceable causation.1 11 Next, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Texas had
shown that its suit could prevent and redress any losses from driver's licenses
by means of the preliminary injunction that temporarily suspended the DAPA
program. 112
As a final argument, the United States argued that Texas's standing ar-
gument was flawed because it would open the floodgates to states challenging
asylum for a single alien or any federal policy that adversely affected a state's
101. Id. at 157-60.
102. Id. at 157.
103. Id. at 156-57.
104. Id. at 157.
105. 426 U.S. 660 (1976) (per curiam).
106. Texas, 809 F.3d at 157.
107. Id. at 158-59.
108. Id. at 159.
109. Id. at 159-60.
110. Id.
111. Id.atl60.
112. Id. at 160-61.
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tax revenue. 113 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the Government's floodgate
criticism was flawed because the Massachusetts decision "entailed similar
risks, but the [Supreme] Court still held that Massachusetts had standing."ll 4
The court of appeals observed that the Massachusetts decision could be broad-
ly interpreted to challenge any federal action that could increase GHGs.115
The Fifth Circuit suggested several legal doctrines such as the "zone of
interest" test, the rule against litigation of matters committed to agency discre-
tion, or issues exempt from rulemaking or public comment requirements,
which would limit the number of state suits and therefore prevent a flood of
state suits against the United States.'1 6 Additionally, the court of appeals rea-
soned that the Massachusetts decision's "special solicitude" test for state
standing applied only where both a federal statute granted a procedural right to
a state and where a quasi-sovereign interest was at stake, and, therefore, stand-
ing would not apply to remote issues as suggested by the United States in its
briefs.'17 Finally, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it was too speculative to con-
sider the Government's slippery slope theory of possible state standing in cases
involving a single individual.118 For example, a state challenge to a grant of
asylum to a single alien would raise questions about whether there was a suffi-
cient standing injury.1 9 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that Texas had
standing to sue to challenge the DAPA program. 120
C. Judge King's Dissenting Opinion
In her dissenting opinion, Judge Carolyn King argued that the panel ma-
jority had wrongly relied upon "a single, isolated phrase" in the Massachusetts
decision, "special solicitude," to conclude that Texas had standing to challenge
DAPA.121 She claimed that "[i]t is altogether unclear whether the majority
means that states are afforded a relaxed standing inquiry by virtue of their
statehood or whether their statehood, in of itself, helps confer standing." 22 She
further reasoned, "Massachusetts also provides little instruction as to how far
this 'special solicitude' reaches. The phrase appears only once in the Massa-
chusetts majority opinion. And the Court has had no occasion to revisit it
since." 23 This Author has previously criticized the Massachusetts decision for
failing to clarify under what circumstances states have greater standing rights,
so Judge King's observation that the case "provides little instruction as to how
113. Id. at 161-62.
114. Id at 161.
115. Id.
116. Id at 162.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 161-62.
120. Id. at 162.
121. Id. at 193 (King, J., dissenting).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 193-94.
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far this 'special solicitude' reaches" has some validity.1 24 Additionally, Judge
King contended that the Massachusetts decision was distinguishable because
the CAA in that case specifically provided for a procedural right for states to
challenge decisions of the EPA, but that "[b]y contrast, neither the Immigration
and Nationality Act 25 ("INA") nor the APA specifically authorizes this
suit." 26
The panel majority, however, used a footnote to respond to her argument
that the phrase "special solicitude" appeared only once in the Massachusetts
decision and should therefore be effectively ignored as providing no real guid-
ance on state standing.1 27 In footnote twenty-six, the Fifth Circuit observed that
the Massachusetts decision's support of state standing rested upon more than
the "special solicitude" phrase:
The dissent, however, avoids mention of the Court's explanation that
"[i]t is of considerable relevance that the party seeking review here is a
sovereign State." Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 518. In light of that
enlargement on the "special solicitude" phrase, it is obvious that being a
state greatly matters in the standing inquiry, and it makes no difference,
in the words of the dissent, "whether the majority means that states are
afforded a relaxed standing inquiry by virtue of their statehood or wheth-
er their statehood, in [and] of itself, helps confer standing." 28
The panel majority was correct in pointing out that state standing was a central
part of the Massachusetts decision and that "special solicitude" could not be
treated as an isolated phrase in the decision as Judge King had argued it
should. 129
Second, Judge King claimed that "the majority's ruling raises serious
separation of powers concerns." 3 0 While it is true that Article III standing is
closely related to separation of powers issueS,131 the Court has divided about
exactly when allowing standing would conflict with fundamental separation-
of-powers principles.1 32 Judge King sought to provide substance for her separa-
tion-of-powers concerns by arguing that the "majority's breathtaking expan-
sion of state standing would inject the courts into far more federal-state dis-
putes and review of the political branches than is now the case." 33
Despite the majority's assurances that various legal doctrines would limit
the scope of state standing, Judge King's third argument was that the majori-
ty's approach would allow far too many state suits against the federal govern-
ment and would transform the federal courts into administrative overseers of
124. Mank, States Standing, supra note 4, at 1733-34, 1746-47, 1755-56 (criticizing Massachusetts for
not clarifying to what extent state standing in the case resulted from the parens patriae doctrine as opposed to
other factors); Mank, Standing for Private Plaintiffs, supra note 18, at 1538-39 (criticizing the same).
125. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)-(h) (2012).
126. Id.
127. Texas, 809 F.3d at 151 n.26.
128. Id.
129. See supra Section III.A.
130. Texas, 809 F.3d at 194 (King, J., dissenting).
131. See supra Part Il.
132. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
133. Texas, 809 F.3d at 194 (King, J., dissenting).
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the executive branch.1 34 She criticized the majority's use of incidental costs re-
lated to driver's licenses to justify state standing for Texas to challenge
DAPA.135 Judge King complained that the Fifth Circuit's decision in the Texas
litigation could serve as precedent to allow states to use indirect economic in-
juries "to allow limitless state intrusion into exclusively federal matters-
effectively enabling the states, through the courts, to second-guess federal pol-
icy decisions-especially when, as here, those decisions involve prosecutorial
discretion." 136 The panel majority, however, effectively argued that several le-
gal doctrines could be invoked by courts to limit state suits against the federal
government.1 37 Part V examines how courts should strike a balance between
allowing state standing for suits against federal actions that substantially im-
pact a state while denying standing in cases involving indirect, marginal, or
trivial injuries to a state. 138
V. STATE STANDING FURTHERS FEDERALISM AND STATES' RIGHTS
The Fifth Circuit majority in the Texas case was correct that courts will
likely invoke standing principles, the zone of interests test, or other legal doc-
trines if states attempt to sue the federal government regarding relatively trivial
issues such as the legal status of an individual alien or a single IRS revenue
ruling.1 39 Yet, even if the critics' claims of endless and unlimited state lawsuits
against the United States are unfounded, Judge King's dissenting opinion
makes a reasonable point that the Fifth Circuit's broad reading of state stand-
ing in Texas could open the door to far more state suits against the executive
branch even if the floodgates are not completely open.1 40 This Part argues that
such suits could help preserve federalism and states' rights against a potentially
overly expansive national government as long as courts reject suits over trivial
injuries or issues that are not judicially reviewable because Congress has dele-
gated them to the complete discretion of an agency, such as in individual en-
forcement decisions.141
134. Id. at 194-96.
135. Id. at 195-96.
136. Id.
137. See supra Section I.B.
138. See infra Part V.
139. Texas, 809 F.3d at 161-62 (majority opinion).
140. Id. at 194-96 (King, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 161-62 (majority opinion).
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A. Different Theories for State Standing
1. Professor Roesler's Governance Theory of State Standing
There are various commentators who have argued for and against state
standing, especially in the wake of the Massachusetts decisionl 42 and even be-
fore the Court decided that case.1 43 It would be impossible to address every dif-
ferent theory in favor of and against state standing rights in this Article, but I
will discuss a few approaches in light of the Texas litigation. For example, Pro-
fessor Shannon M. Roesler argues that "states should have 'governance' stand-
ing to challenge" the federal government's actions when a federal statute gives
the state a role in implementing the federal program.144 Because neither DAPA
nor federal immigration law, in general, contemplate an implementation role
for states, Professor Roesler argues that standing was inappropriate in United
States v. Texas.145 Her standing analysis, however, ignores the significant im-
pacts that the Fifth Circuit found DAPA had on Texas's driver's license pro-
gram.1 46 Her "governance" standing theory provides clarity as she claims, but
that clarity comes at the expense of ignoring real standing injuries from federal
actions that do not involve state implementation of a federal statute.1 4 7
2. The State Sovereignty Movement
As part of a state "sovereignty movement," several states have enacted
statutes that sometimes prohibit state officers from assisting in the enforcement
of federal laws and sometimes purport to nullify particular federal regula-
tions.1 48 In 2010, Congress passed, and President Obama signed into law, the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("ACA").149 Virginia passed a state
law proclaiming that "[n]o resident of this Commonwealth .. . shall be re-
quired to obtain or maintain a policy of individual insurance coverage." 50 The
Virginia statute sought to block the ACA's "individual mandate," which re-
quires most individuals to either purchase health insurance or pay a penalty.' 5 '
Virginia sued the U.S. Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Ser-
vices to block the individual mandate as an unconstitutional exercise of con-
gressional power beyond the scope of the Constitution's Commerce Clause.1 52
142. Tara Leigh Grove, When Can a State Sue the United States?, 101 CORNELL L. REv. 851, 853 nn.7-
10 (2016) (citing articles approving of and criticizing the Massachusetts decision).
143. Id. at 854 n.1 1 (citing articles).
144. Shannon M. Roesler, State Standing to Challenge Federal Authority in the Modern Administrative
State, 91 WASH. L. REv. 637, 641-42, 677-702 (2016).
145. Id. at 699-02.
146. See supra Section IV.B.
147. Roesler, supra note 144, at 641-42, 677-702.
148. Austin Raynor, The New State Sovereignty Movement, 90 IND. L.J. 613, 614-58 (2015).
149. Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010); Raynor, supra note 148, at
614.
150. Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 267 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. §
38.2-3434.1:1 (2011)); Roesler, supra note 144, at 695.
151. Roesler, supra note 144, at 695 (discussing 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(a)-(b) (2012)).
152. Virginia, 656 F.3d at 266; Roesler, supra note 144, at 695-96.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Virginia
lacked standing because its statute merely declared that its citizens were ex-
empt from federal legal requirements when those individuals could sue the
government on their own behalf and because there was no evidence of injury to
the Commonwealth based on that statute. 153 Virginia might have proven stand-
ing if it had instead focused on the impact of the ACA on state regulatory pro-
grams or on the fact that the ACA arguably requires states to participate in its
implementation.1 54 Furthermore, because Virginia passed its statute after the
enactment of the ACA, the state statute may have appeared to be solely a de-
claratory attempt to nullify federal law.155 By contrast, the Fifth Circuit specif-
ically found that Texas had not manufactured standing because the Texas legis-
lature had adopted subsidized licenses a year before the government
announced the DACA program and three years before DHS promulgated
DAPA.156
3. Professor Tara Leigh Grove's Arguments Limiting State Suits About
Separation ofPowers Concerns
Professor Tara Leigh Grove argues that states should have standing to sue
only to protect federalism principles when the federal government preempts or
interferes with the enforcement of a state law.' 57 But she contends that states
should not have special solicitude standing to challenge how federal laws are
enforced or alleged violations of the separation of powers based on that en-
forcement because state attorneys general have no special insight or interest in
the operations of the federal government. 158 Professor Grove suggests the Mas-
sachusetts decision was wrong to recognize state standing based upon the
EPA's failure to regulate greenhouse gases, but she also suggests that the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts could have had standing if the Clean Air Act
preempted a Massachusetts law that sought to regulate GHGs.59
Professor Grove criticizes the Fifth Circuit's standing analysis in the Tex-
as DAPA litigation for granting standing based upon the costs of driver's li-
censes because that decision effectively allows Texas to challenge the imple-
mentation of federal law, the DAPA program.1 60 Additionally, in general, and
particularly in the Texas litigation, she contends that there should be a tight
link between the injury asserted, the cost of driver's licenses, and the remedy
so that Texas could not win a nationwide injunction against the enforcement of
DAPA.161 Conversely, she would allow Texas to bring a declaratory action that
it is not required to issue driver's licenses to DAPA beneficiaries because a
153. Virginia, 656 F.3d at 267-72; Roesler, supra note 144, at 696-97; see also Grove, supra note 142, at
876-80 (arguing that state laws that declare that their citizens are exempt from federal law are insufficient to
provide state standing).
154. Roesler, supra note 144, at 697-98.
155. Id. at 696.
156. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 159 (5th Cir. 2015).
157. Grove, supra note 142, at 854-57, 880-85.
158. Id. at 854-57, 886-99.
159. Id. at 889.
160. Id. at 894-95.
161. Id. at 895 n.215.
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state should be able to challenge a federal law or action that forces the state to
change its own law.1 62
Professor Grove challenges the views of scholars who believe that state
attorneys general are uniquely suited to bring actions against the federal gov-
ermnent and instead argues that state attorneys general are mostly motivated by
partisan political interests, although she acknowledges that they occasionally
act in what they believe is the public interest. 163 Furthermore, she contends that
states attorneys general are mostly experts in the interests of their own states
and not in how federal laws should be implemented.1 64 Moreover, Professor
Grove wishes to limit state standing because "[s]tates already have broader au-
thority to invoke the federal judicial power than other litigants.",65
Professor Grove's restrictive approach to state standing, however, would
prevent states from establishing standing in federal courts to remedy real inju-
ries, such as GHG emissions in the Massachusetts decision or the costs of
driver's licenses in the Texas DAPA litigation. 166 States should be able to chal-
lenge the implementation of federal law to prevent significant economic or
physical injuries to a state or its residents. 167 That such suits sometimes protect
the constitutional separation of powers from the executive branch's arguably
illegal actions is a potential bonus of state standing. 168 Conversely, as in the
Virginia ACA litigation, a state would not have standing merely by enacting a
state law declaring that its citizens are exempt from a federal law when a state
suffers no proven injury. 169
B. Federalism Arguments for State Standing
The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution recognizes the im-
portance and continuing role of states in our federal system of government. 170
In Alfred L. Snapp & Sons, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, ex rel. Barez, the Supreme
Court recognized that "the State has an interest in securing observance of the
terms under which it participates in the federal system."1 71 In Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, the Court acknowledged that the Con-
stitution does not explicitly explain the role or function of states in relationship
162. Id. at 895.
163. Id. at 895-98; see also Michael E. Solimine, State Amici, Collective Action, and the Development of
Federalism Doctrine, 46 GA. L. REv. 355, 381-84 (2012) (discussing debate about whether amicus briefs from
states attorneys general deserve deference because of their status as elected officials).
164. Grove, supra note 142, at 895-98.
165. Id. at 895 n.215.
166. See supra Section m.A; supra Section IV.B.
167. See supra Section m.A; supra Section IV.B.
168. See supra Section m.A; supra Section IV.B; supra Part V.
169. See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 656 F.3d 253, 267 (4th Cir. 2011); supra Section V.A.2.
It is possible Virginia might have shown injury from the federal Affordable Care Act to its regulatory pro-
grams, but it failed to do so in its litigation. Roesler, supra note 144, at 697-98.
170. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
171. 458 U.S. 592, 607-08 (1982); Brief for Federal Courts Scholars and Southeastern Legal Foundation
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 29, United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (No. 15-674)
[hereinafter Amicus Briefj, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/15-674-bsac-Fed-Courts-
Scholars.pdf.
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to the federal government but reasoned in light of the Constitution as a whole
that "the principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States
in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself." 72
In the modem era of broad executive authority and agency power, the primary
protection for states is their representation in Congress.1 73 Unilateral executive
actions, such as DHS's issuance of the DAPA memorandum, that avoid the
legislative process raise questions about how states may protect their interests
from executive actions that have significant impacts on states if Congress has
no role in initiating or controlling a unilateral executive action.1 74
The Snapp decision recognized that states may file a parens patriae ac-
tion to protect the state's quasi-sovereign interests in the health and welfare of
its citizens. 175 Subsequently, the Massachusetts decision determined that states
may file a parens patriae action to sue the federal government for violating a
state's interests under a federal statute.1 76 The Fifth Circuit appropriately ap-
plied the Massachusetts decision's special solicitude doctrine for state standing
so that states could protect their interests against unilateral executive action
when no other party had an effective opportunity to challenge that action. 177
Because state attorneys general are elected officials subject to the political pro-
cess in each state, they are the best litigants for suits checking unilateral execu-
tive action that is not subject to effective congressional review. 178 Since the
Massachusetts decision in 2007 opened the door to broader state standing
rights in federal court, both Democratic and Republican state attorneys general
have embraced the idea of serving as a check on federal executive action, es-
pecially when the sitting president is not from the same political party as the
state attorney general filing suit in a particular case. 179
172. 469 U.S. 528, 550 (1985).
173. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) ("[I]nasmuch as this Court in Garcia has left primar-
ily to the political process the protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress' Commerce
Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise."); Amicus Brief, supra
note 171, at 29-30.
174. Amicus Brief, supra note 171, at 25-26, 29-31.
175. Snapp, 458 U.S. at 608-09.
176. See supra Section M.A.
177. Amicus Brief, supra note 171, at 25-26, 29-31.
178. Id. at 25-31; Mank, States Standing, supra note 4, at 1783-85 (discussing the advantages of litiga-
tion by state attorneys general, although acknowledging states attorneys general may have biases based on
desire for re-election or seeking higher office). But cf PAUL NOLETTE, FEDERALISM ON TRIAL 13-17 (2015)
(discussing how politics and private interests affect litigation by state attorneys general); Solimine, supra note
163, at 383-85 (questioning whether states attorneys general truly represent interests of their states).
179. Henry Gass, Attorneys General Embrace Role as Check on Executive Power, On Right and Left,
CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2016/1221/
Attomeys-general-embrace-role-as-check-on-executive-power-on-right-and-left.
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C. State Standing Rights Protect Against Excessive National Government
A more theoretical justification for broad state standing rights is based
upon a libertarian goal of limiting the scope of government.180 The Constitu-
tion's system of separation of powers and checks and balances attempts to lim-
it the authority of any one power in government.181 DHS's unilateral issuance
of a DAPA memorandum, however, is a prominent example of the executive
branch using arguably unconstitutional methods to avoid legislative checks on
executive power. 182 State standing is the only practical means to challenge uni-
lateral executive actions such as the DAPA memorandum.1 83
Some libertarians argue for the complete elimination of all govern-
ment.1 84 Most libertarians, however, acknowledge that some amount of gov-
ernment is necessary, although they are strongly concerned with placing en-
forceable limits on the scope of government and its exercise of power.185 In his
2016 book Our Republican Constitution, Professor Randy Barnett argues that
it is more feasible to limit the power of state or local governments than the fed-
eral government because it is easier for citizens to move from one state or city
to another but more difficult to move to a different country.1 8 6 While he
acknowledges that state and local policies are imperfect, he argues that a "rich
diversity of preferred lifestyles can only be achieved at the local level" and that
"it is preferable to have the variety of options provided by fifty state govern-
ments than a one-size-fits-all national policy." 87
Professor Barnett suggests that state governments should have some way
to check the power of the federal government.1 88 He does not discuss state
standing in his book, but suits like the Texas litigation would offer the means
to place some possible judicial checks on unilateral executive actions that by-
pass Congress.1 89 Thus, state standing suits are consistent with his libertarian
approach of favoring state and local governments against national power.
180. David Boaz, Libertarianism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/
libertarianism-politics (last visited Nov. 13, 2017) ("Although most libertarians believe that some form of gov-
ernment is essential for protecting liberty, they also maintain that government is an inherently dangerous insti-
tution whose power must be strictly circumscribed. Thus, libertarians advocate limiting and dividing govern-
ment power through a written constitution and a system of checks and balances.").
181. See id.; supra Part II (discussing separation of powers principles); supra Section IV.B (discussing
the same).
182. See supra Section V.B.; Amicus Brief, supra note 171, at 25-31, 36-37 (arguing state standing is
the only practical way to challenge unilateral executive action and that states are within the zone of interest of
the U.S. Constitution's Article II "Take Care" Clause).
183. Amicus Brief, supra note 171, at 25-31 (arguing state standing is only practical way to challenge
unilateral executive action). Theoretically, Congress might impeach government officials or cut off appropria-
tions to an agency, but impeachment requires a two-thirds majority in the Senate, and Congress would need a
two-thirds majority to override a presidential veto of an appropriations bill. See Bradford C. Mank, Does Unit-
ed States v. Windsor (The DOMA Case) Open the Door to Congressional Standing Rights?, 76 U. PiTT. L.
REV. 1, 51-52 (2014) (discussing impracticability of impeachment and appropriation processes).
184. Boaz, supra note 180.
185. Id.
186. BARNETr, supra note 11, at 176-80.
187. Id. at 178.
188. Id. at 180.
189. Amicus Brief, supra note 171, at 25-31 (arguing state standing is the only practical way to challenge
unilateral executive action).
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VI. CONCLUSION
State standing and suits against executive actions are an imperfect limit
on national political power because their success ultimately depends on wheth-
er the judges hearing the case appreciate the value of limiting federal power
and restricting unilateral executive actions and whether the judges embrace
libertarian values or adopt some combination of these principles. Professor
Barnett's reform proposals emphasize structural limits on political power, such
as constitutional conventions, because he considers judicial limits on national
power ineffective and dependent on the personality of individual justices.1 90
Nevertheless, the Texas litigation demonstrates that state standing allows states
to at least challenge and question unilateral executive actions, and such suits
are better than a system where no one can challenge an important legal ques-
tion such as the validity of DAPA under the APA or Take Care Clause. 191 Even
if someone favors DAPA's policies, he or she should be concerned with the
unilateral process adopted by the Obama administration. 192 The Massachusetts
decision's special solicitude for state standing and the Fifth Circuit's decision
supporting state standing in Texas v. United States are the most practical solu-
tion to allow states to challenge arguably illegal actions by the executive
branch or federal government.1 93
Yet, the Fifth Circuit in Texas appropriately sought to balance allowing
state standing in cases where states suffer significant injuries with imposing
limitations on excessive suits through several non-standing legal doctrines that
would limit the number of state suits and, accordingly, prevent state suits
against the United States from becoming unmanageable for the federal
courts.194 In response to Judge King's concerns about opening a floodgate of
litigation, the panel majority suggested that it would not allow state standing in
cases where only minor injuries had occurred, such as an injury concerning a
single individual that would have no appreciable impact on a state. 195 This Ar-
ticle agrees with the Fifth Circuit majority in Texas that it is possible to recog-
nize state standing in cases where a state suffers a significant injury without
permitting every conceivable state suit against the federal government. 196
190. BARNETr, supra note 11, at 170-71, 254-58 (explaining the concept of structural limits in the U.S.
Constitution and proposing a constitutional convention to impose structural protections to secure individual
liberties as a better alternative than relying on "judges who ignore the original meaning of our Republican
Constitution.").
191. See supra Section IV.B; supra Part V; Amicus Brief, supra note 171, at 25-31 (arguing state stand-
ing is only practical way to challenge unilateral executive action).
192. Amicus Brief, supra note 171, at 25-26, 29-31.
193. See supra Section IV.B; supra Part V; Amicus Brief, supra note 171, at 25-31 (arguing state stand-
ing is only practical way to challenge unilateral executive action).
194. See supra Section IV.B.
195. See supra Section IV.B; supra Section I.C.
196. See supra Section N.B.
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